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..GENESIS OF NIGERIA'S DEBT PROBLEMS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
FOR DEBT CONVERSION''*
J. o. sANUsI,

DEput"

arur*tol.,

aENTRAL BANK oF NI.ERTA

Intmdtrtbn

for our

It'lr. Otairmm
Distinguished Gueets,

at a more opportuned time than now that the guidelines and
institutional arangements and safeguards to ensure the
success of this laudable progmlnme are being worked out

Ladix rnd Gentlemen,

It gives me geat pleasure to have been invited to
participate in, and to deliver a paper at this Wo*shop
organised by Continental Merchant Bank Nigeria Limited to

as

people. This Workshop could

not have come up

earlier promised by the kesident.
I have been specifically requested

to deliver a paper on
"The Genesis of Nigeria's External Debt hoblems: Problems
and Prospects for Debt Conversion Programme for Nigeria"
as a background to the central theme of the Workdrop.
The presentation is divided into four s€ctions. Part I deals
with the Genesis of Nigeria's Debt Problems. Part II hiShliShts
the rationale of Debt Conversion and the general problems
associated with it. Part III sketches the Prospects of Debt
Conversion in Nigeria while Part IV contains the Summary

deliberate on "The Proposed Operations of Nigeda's Debt
Conversion Programme". I would [ke to recall that in his
1988 Budget Speech, the President and Commander-in{hief
stated among other things that as part of our strategy to
reduce our external debt burden, authentic debts owed to
willing foreign creditors, would be considered for conversion
to equity inyestment especially in new high-Priority projects
which would use local raw matedals and proYide employment

and some concluding remarks.

PART I: THE GENESIS OF NIGERIA,S DEBT PROBLEMS
some of the arrears. Total trade arrears grew rapidly
from H2.0 billion in 1982 to !{47.6 billion or 47 .2 pet cf.nt,
constituting the single largest source of debt.
Following from the trend descdbed above, Nigqria's
total extemal debt outstanding rose from !+1.3 billion
(8.2 billion) in 1978 to H10.6 billion ($14.1 billion) in
1983 and rose rapidly to H100.8 billion (S23.4 bitlion)
respectively in 1986 and 1987 following exchange rate

of

The Sources, Magnitude and Trend in Nigeria's External
Debt 1970 - 1987

The sources, magnitude and trend in Nigeria's external
debt outstanding from 1970 to 1987 are illustrated in
Table l. The size of Nigeria's extemal debt was very low
in the pedod up to 1977. Even at the end of the civil war,
in 1970, Nigeria's external debt outstanding was only N488.8
million (US $84.3 million). Thereafter, extemal debt
declined sharply to N234.5 million ($308.9 million) in l97l
and then rose only gradually to H496.9 million (fi62.9
million) at the end of 1977. Up lo this period, debts were
contracted in rclatively small

a

depreciation.
Causes of Nfierh's Debt Problems
The causes of Nigeria's debt problems include domestic
and external factors. lt should be mentioned however, that
the exogenous factors over which the Ni8erian authorities
have no control complicated the inherent weaknesses in both
the structure and management of the NiSerian economy to
impose a severe debt problem on the country. A rnajor
defect of the Nigerian economy is the heavily dependence
on the export of one major commodity - oil. In 1980,
the oil sector which accounted for o y 22 per cent of the
GDP provided about 80 per cent of govemment revenue
and over 95 per cent of export earnings. This feature is still
very much the same today. Nigeria is also highly dependent
on the industrialised countries for industrial and consumer

Ihe

ounts and were largely to

supplement domestic resources

for the provision of

infrastructural facilities and agricultural projects.
Following the emergence of the glut in the intemational
crude oil market in 1978 with the attendant strains on the
balance of payments, extemal reserves and govemment
finances, Nigeria, for the lrst time had recourse to borrow
in larger chunks and shorter matudties from the
Intemational Capital Market (ICM) at higher and variable
interest rates. A number of ICMjumbo loan were negotiated
in 1978 and 1979 for balance ofpayments support purposes,
and for the establislment of a domestic steel industry.
Many more such ICM loans were raised, especially as funds
from bilateral and multilateral institutions became increasingly

inadequate

to the

needs

of

for the
development programmes, These attributes
of the Nigerian economy make it vulnerable to external
shocks as is the case with most third world counlries. The
glut in the international oil market in 1978 and the protracted
collapse in crude oil prices in the market since 1982 is a
case in point. This is turther aggravated by the declining
goods import as well as the finance requted
prosecution

goyernment. Consequently,

ICM loans rose rapidly from Nl.0 billion in 1979 to N5.5
billion in 1982 and to H40.5 billion in 1987, when it
constituted 4O.2 per cent of total extemal debt. In the same
pedod, State govemments joined th€ bandwagon of extemal
borrowing.
However, the single largest and most insidious source
of increase in Nigeria's extemal debt and the ensuing debt
crisis is accumulated trade arrears which emerged in 1982.
Subsequent debt s€rice difficulties had led to the refinancing

of

*Being the text of a Lecture delivered at the Intemational Workshop
Proposed Operations of Debt ConversbrvAsset Trading
Programme organised by Contin€ntal Merchant Batk of Nigeria
Limited at Sheraton Hotel, Lagos, l3th - 14th June, 1988.

on the
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terms

of trade in all other

by the ratio of debt service to exports of goods
and services rosc rapidly from 0.7 per cent in 1980 to a peak
of 33.2 pcr cent in 1985. Thereafter. it fell to 29.4 and I I .9
per cenl in 1986 and 1987. respectively. This ratio would
have risen above 65 per cent since 1986 but lor payment

Nigerian export commodities.
of payment difficulties
and dwindling reserves and govcrnment finances led the
authorities to resort to ICM medium.term jumbo loans
with higher interest rates and the involuntary accumulation
of import arrears. The resultant shili in the term-structure
of Nigeria's external debt, shortened loan maturitics and
created the problem ol bunching of dcbt service obligalions.
Bunching in turn created the problent ol default and the
rapid build up payment arrears.
When the debt crisis surfaccd the desperatcly needed
foreign krans to tidy over, dried up. Creditors who considercd
Nigcria under-borrowed and wcre eagcr to lcnd liberally
during thc oil boom suddcnly became critical if not cynical
of the policies of a country they had goadcd into the debt
trap.
On the domestic front, some of the debt problems can be
attributed to excessivc reliance on externill dcbt and, with
the eye of hind-sight. on inappropriate fiscal. monetary and
exrernal debt policies. For example. worthwhile industrial
projects such as stcel and paper mills were financed with
short and mediurn'term loans with amortisation lalling due
before project completion. Some borruwed Iunds have been
used to finance prestigious projects or allegedly diverted to
unintended uses- Inappropriate nronctary and fiscal policies
arose from the f'act that the initial signals of cxternal shocks

measured

As noted earlier, the resultant balance

were considercd to be lemporary. The

delaults and subsequent debt restructuring and

The hea\y debt problem has

disrupted economic

dcrclcrpnrent anrl lras created other serrous socto.economic
problems. llcavy debt servicc payrnents and altempts to
nrinimise balance of payments deficits and prevenl lhe
depletion of cxternal reserves had led to very drastic

curtailmcnt of imports. For example, the value of imports
which rose by 47.,4 and 42.0 per cent in 1980 and 1981,

respectively declined by an annual average of l5 pcr cent
from 1982 to 1986. At N5.5 billion in 1986, merchandise
imports were only 42.4 per cenr of the l98l peak of NI2.9
billion. Imporr compression lcd to severe reduction in
dcvelopment projccts and induslrial production. These in
turn led to curtailntent of donrestic production, scarcity of

gocds and services and spiralling inflation. With the exception
of 1985. real CDP growth rates wcrc ncgative from l9g2

1986. Poor cconomic perlormance worsened

the

unemployment situation and aggravated social problems.
Thc accunlulation ol import payment arrears and default
on debt scrvice paymeflts. cspecially since 1983 threatened
credit worthiness and solvency which culminated in the
refusai of lbreign correspondent banks to open lines of
credit for Nigerian importers in early 1986. Nigeria gradually
began to regain its credit worthiness on the adoption of an
IMF and World Bank-supported Structural Adjustment
Programme. opcrative July 1986 to June 1988.
Debt restructuring which has been adopted to provide
debt relief havc created other sets olproblems. R.estructuring,
lor example does not eliminate the debt but pushes it to a
later date- Besides, restructuring exercises are complex and
expensive. For example, a Paris CIub cxercise involves an
intricate negotiation and agreenent with the Club. Such an
agrecment. howevcr does not constitute debt restructuring.
Actual debt restructuring then involves protracted
negotiations with each creditor nation. Such exercises sap
the erergies oI top government funclionaries and divert
their attention from the more important issues of growth

expansionary

monetary and fiscal policies as wcll as the rigid excllangc
rate and pricing policies pursucd, led lo serious adverse
consequences for the economy in the form of domestic

inflation. over-valuation of the Naira exchangc rate, capital
flight. distortion in relative prices. encouragement ofimports
and discouragenrenl of production for export and other
depressant effccts on the domestic econonry.

The Magnitude and Seyerity of the Debt Problem
Following the sharp incrcases in external debt, amortisation

nnd interest payrnenls rose siglitlcantly and debt

debt

rescheduling.

servicc

payments increascd co rrcspondingly . As shown on Table 2,
debt servicc payments rosc fronr Nl0l.6 million in 1980
to Nl .3 billion in l9tl3 and then to H3.6 billion in 1987.
The magnitude and severity of the Nigcria's dcbt problcm
is more forcefully denronstrated by the cxamination of
certain debt ratios. As shown in Table 3, all the ratios have
risen rapidly especially since 1982, indicating that the debt
burden has increased substantially. For instance. the debl/
export ratio rose from only 13.3 per cent in 1980 to 486.9
pcr ccnt in 1986 before it declincd to 333.3 per cenr in
1987. The rario of debt to the gross domestic product at
factor cost rose monotonously from only 3.8 per cent in
1980 to 94.1 per cent in 1987. Similarly the debt burden as

and developnlent. It may also be mentioned tlut debt
restructuring t urns private and unguarant€ed debts into

federal government and/or Central Bank obligations. Despite
the inconvenience and the direct and indirect costs ofdebt
restructuring, the much orchestrated "new money" which
forms part of the negotiated packages are rarely provided.

This has tended to aggravate the burden of adjustment
required to implement the economic reforms and which
colstitutes a major condition for debt restructudng.

PART II: THE PROBLEMS OF DEBT CONVERSION
design measures to all€viate it. More importantly, it has
become increasingly recognised that the best solution to the
debt problem lies in the revival of economic growth and

The Emergence of Debt Conversion
The increased awareness of the

debt problems facing
many developing countries since 1982 has led to concerted
efforts on the part of both creditor and debtor nations to

recovery
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in

normal market asess. However, prevailing

unplanned increase in money supply leading to
inflationary and exchange rate pressures.

international economic and financial envirolment as
characteris€d by falling commodity prices, deteriorating
terms of trade, high real interest rates and the r€luctance
of creditor banks and nations to increase lheir exposure
to debtor countries has militated against growth. The relief
provided by the traditional approach to debt restructuring
has not only been slow, insufficient and unsatisfactory, the
associated financial flows have been grossly inadequate.
The over-publicised "new money" packages included in
economic reform programmes, debt restructuring packages
and other arrangements such as the "Programme for

(ii)

involves the conversion ofpart or all ofthe redemption
proc€eds into foreign exchange in the official foreign

exchange market

programmed levels and the burden

at

problem has s€rious consequences for the exchange
rate and the balance of payments. Balance of
payments pressures could also arise when local

of adjustment

currency proceeds are used excessively on the foreign
exchange market to source the offshore costs of local

below

has been

investment.

circumstances, increasing number of debtridden countries, notably Brazil, Chile, Costa fuca, Ecuador,

increased.

ln the

(iii)

Mexico, The Philippines and Turkey, have one after the
other adopted Debt Conversion Programmes as one of the
approaches to further ease their debt burden and stimulate
gowth-induced investment.
The Concept and Types of Debt Conversion

Debt conversion involves exchanging external debt lbr
domestic debt or equity. The redemptor, if he is not the
original creditor, uses foreign exchange to purchase a
country's debt at a discount, either from the original creditor
or in the secondary market. He then negotiates with the
agency charged with the responsibility of managing the

(iv) The

(iii)

nust be sufficiently attractive to the investor to
make a DCP worthwhi.le: e.g. it should approximate

country's foreign currency debt for local

the official rate or the parallel market rate. On the
other hand, an excessively favourably transaction's
effective exchange rate creates problems, two of
which are highlighted here:

(a)
Debt for Debt Conyersion: the exchange of foreign
currency debt for domestic debt which may be sold
for cash in the secondary market.

(b) The inherent distortions in relative

of

cash

in foreign

prices

(exchange rate and asset prices) would tend
encourage round trippin8 e.g.by encouraging
the purchase of foreign exchange in the parallel
market for the purchase of discounted debt

to

Debt for Exports: under which exports are paid
combination

Large implicit subsidy is given to convcrted
debts which will inadvertently introduce a
distofiion in resource allocation in the ecoflomy.

Debt for Cash Conversion: exchange of debt for
local currency which can be used for local working

for in a

Optimal Transaction's

mined by a combination of factors such as the discounted purchase pdce of the debt to be converted,
any taxes or conversion charges and the exchange rate
applied. This transaction's effective exchange rate

capital,loan repayments and local tax payments.

(iv)

of an

The transaction's effective exchange rate is deter-

currency that can be used for the establishment of
new enterprises, or for the purchase of equity shares
in existing private sector concerns and privatised
publicly owned enterprises.

(ii)

Determination

Effective Exchang€ Rate:

Debt for Equity Convenion: entailing the exchange

of a

Degree of Additionality;
The degree of "additionality" present in a debt
conversion pro8ramme refers to the ability of debt
swaps to attract foreign equity investment and
flight capital which otherwise would not have come
to the country. Thus the advantages associated with
DCP depend on the degree of additionality, in the
absence of which only modest benefit would result

Ihe

from debt-equity conversion.

conversion programme in the debtor country, usually the
Central Bank, to exchange the acquired debt for local
currency or local debt.
The following are among the basic types of debt
conversion scheme currently in use:

(i)

or in the paralled market for
or at a later date. This

exportation immediately

Sustained Growth" in the "Baker Plan" seldom materialise.

Consequently, growth rates are stunted

Round Tripping And Exchange Rst€ Presf,lles:
A DCP offers opportunity for round tripping which

which will then be converted into local currency
through official channel.

currency

and debt.

(v)

of the problems are

Danger of Structural Cnnge in Busines OwnerSip
DCP tends to increse fears about the possibitity of
a radical change in the structure ofbusiness ownership
in favour of foreigners. Such fears tend to generate
political sensitivity about the Proposed Prograrnme.

Money Supply and lnflation: Arising from the
fact that most debt conversion transactions involve
the release of local currency, there could be

Minimising the Disadvantages of Debt Conrcrsion
As crucial as the problems highlighted above may be,
they are not insurmountable. Nigeria can draw amply on the
experiences of other countlies to minimise or eliminare

The Problems of Debt Conversion
The main problems of debt conversion largely relate to a
number of adverse ntacroeconomic implications of a debt

conversion programme (DCP). Some
summarised below.

(i)

3l

(iv)

them in the design of a workable conversion programme.

For example, the problem of money supply and the

requirement that participating residents must show
evidence that foreign exchange used for acquiring

attendant inflationary pressures can be alleviated in various

debt had been obtained from a foreign account

ways including:

and not from the foreign exchange market.

(i) the setting of limits on the amount

and type of

The determination of an optimunl transaction's effective
exchange rate is an intricate issue that cannot be fully
addressed in this presentation. Suffice it to mention that

debt to be converted;

(ii)

blocking the redemption proceeds in an account
with the Central Bank from which releases would be
made over time according to the cash requirements

available evidence show

minimal use of debt for cash conversion and maxinlum
use for productive investment or uses which do not
create new money but make use of existing liquidity
such as the issue of special long-dated local currency
denominated debt instruments which can be traded in
the local secondary market. Similarly, foreign debts

can be swapped for share participation

in

notes

For example, the discounted value of these notes are as low
as 28 to 34 of their face value. Thst is, one US dollar
promissory note was being traded for 28 to 34 Cents. This
price was only marginally higher than lhar of the Zairean
debt among the l9 countries sampled (see table 4).
Consequently, it should be possible to convert these notes
under an official programme at sizeable discounts plus
conversion charges or taxes and yet obtain attractive

of the investment projects;

(iil)

that Nigeria's promissory

haye been selling at heavy discounts in the secondary market.

lransaction's effective exchanBe rate.

the

proposed government privatisation programnte;

Adrrntages of Debt Conversion

(iv)

At this point I

domestic credit policy could be used to dampen the
inflationary impact of increase in money supply.
Demand for domestic credit by already established
business would be reduced to the extent that they
benefit from redemption proceeds. New enterprises
benefiting from redemption proceeds are not likely
to depend much at least initially, on credil from the

debt and the scale of the adopted conversion programme
are crucial in this regard. Debt repayment capacity is also
enhanced not only by virtue of the discount applied on
swaps but also because returns on investments are procyclical rather than counter-cyclical. In other words, the

donrestic banking system. Consequently, an
appropriate scaling down of credit ceiling may not
adversely affect credit demand by the private sector.
The reduced credit ceiling could be accompanied by
increase in banking cash reserve and liquidity ratio
requirements.

host country only makes foreign exchange available when an

investment is profitable enough to generate dividends as
opposed to interest payments which continue to accrue

There is no way to completely eliminate "round tripping"
However. its incidence can be minimised bv:

(i)

would like to mention some of the

advantages of debt conversion, especially from the standpoint
of a debtor country. Debt conversion as a debt management
tool serves to reduce a counfty's stock of outstandint debt
and lighten the debt service burden without the use of the
country's scarce foreign exchange resources. The size of the

regardless of economic performance.

Debt conversion, and more specifically Debt/Equity
conversion could serve as a tool for stimulating inward
capital investment flows with the attendant beneficial effect

favouring redemption for purposes such as investment
to ensure that
redemption proceeds are used exclusively for approved

which can be easily monitored

on the level of economic activities and employment. A

purposes;

DCP can also assist the recapitalisation of the priyate sector.
In other words, a debt conversion programme could become

yehicle to promote investment-led economic growth. A
debt conversion prograrnme can provide an incentive to the
repatriation of flight capital or foreign exchange held abroad
by nationals, Finally, a DCP can generate revenue for
Sovernment at the time of conyersion and from tax on
profitable investments to which redemption proceeds are

a

(ii)

requesting beneficiaries under the programme to
show evidence of import financing.

(iii)

setting minimum time before capital and dividends
can be repatriated. Such time limits are usually
related to the maturity of the redeemed debt;

PART

III:

put.

PROSPECTS OF DEBT CONVERSION IN NIGERIA
instrum€nts which created the US Dollar denominated
promissory notes issued since April 1984 had enyisaged a
debt conversion programme in Nigeria. Specifically, clause 7
of the terms and conditions of the promissory notes states

Given the advantages and the devises available for
the problems of debt conversion, and given
the increasing acceptability of debt conversion as a new
instrument of debt management snd economic growth
in debt-ridden countri€s of comparable structure and level
minimising

among other things that:

of economic development as Nigeria, there aregood prospects
for a debt conversion progriunme in Nigeria. In fact the legal

"The holder of this Note may redeem this note at any

3:

time in whole or in part in Naira on such terms as may
be mutually agreed between the holder and the Central
Bank ofNigeria. . ."

"lf
7

Objectives
The objectives of

investment in priority sectoN
for the generation of employment and the production
and use of local raw materials;

(iii) the stimulation and encouragement of production

In fact basd on these conditions, promissory notes worth
US $35.4 million were redeemed h puts of 1986/87. The
limited experiment was suspended in March 1986 following
the avalanche of requests for conversion for which no

for export.
Rules and Reguhtions

The rules and regulations strould be comprehenslve and
yet easy to understand. Redemption procedure should be
clearly stated and the redemption authority and locatlon

adequate arrangement has been made. Thus, the President
and Commander-in-Chief in his budget speech referred to

earlier, stated that the guidelines and the institutional
arrangements would be made to ensure that the laudable
objectives of a Nigerian DCP does not run counter to the
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree ald that it is not

clearly designated. Eligible transactions to $r'hich redemption
proceeds could be applied should be comprehensive and
flexible but with prominence given to investments which are
in line with the earlier stated objectives. Eligible padicipants
should include foreigners and nationals who have notes to
redeem. Neither of them should have access to the FEM for
the purchase of debt instruments to be converted.

frustrated by those who may be scheming to re-convert such

for

subsequent transfer abroad. From the foregoing, there is

no doubt that official policy favours the adoption of a
debt conversion progranxne in Nigeria. This leads us to the
consideration of what should be the main features of zuch

Controb and Safegurds
The volume of debt to be converted should be subject to
control consistent with other monetary and Iiscal policy
objectiYes of government.
Appropdate remittance restrictions should be imposed on
the repatriation of interest, dividend and capital in line
with the maturity structure of the redeemed debt.

Prograrnme.

A

service

(ii) the stimulation of

foreign cunency and accordingly will benefit from
approvedstatus..."

a

external debt and debt

burden;

investment in Nigeria specifically approved by the Republic
such investment will be treated as having been made in

into foreign currency through the FEM

Nigerian DCP should include:

(i) the reduction of

the proceeds of the redemption under this condition
are applied by the holder for purpose of long'term

proceeds

a

Nigerian Debt Conversion Programme should have

clearly stated objectives which will be complementary to
the ongoing efforts to revamp the economy and put it on the
path to sustain economic growth. Redemption procedure,
regulations, ufeguards and controls to ensure the smooth
operation of the programme should be well designed and
clearly articulated. At this stage, some specific suggestions
would be proferred, drawing largely on the experiences of
other countries and reflections on the advantages and

ln

order

to

minimise the balance

of

payments and

exchange rate effects, safeguards sltould be provided for
ensuring that participants have independent source of foreign
exchange to coyer part or all ofthe offshore cost ofprojects
financed with the proceeds of a Nigerian DCP.

Adequate proyision should

disadvantages enumerated as well as the measures that have
been proposed for minimising zuch disadvantages,

be made tor

penalising

transactions yiolating the provisions of the DCP.

PART IV: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this presentation, we haye been discussing the genesis
of Nigeria's extemal debt problems as well as the problems
and prospects for debt conversion in Nigeria. The genesis of

of Nigeria's debl problem include the
inappropriate fiscal/monetary and exchange rate policy
measures which were designed largely on the assumption
that what was infact a fundamental structural problem was a
identified sources

Nigeria's debt problem was traced to lhe substantial increases
in the debt from I978 when Nigeria resorted to borrowing

temporary one.

of

syndicated loans from the lnternational
Capital Market (ICM). The large loans were of shorter

The debt burden has disrupted economic development
and has created serious sociGeconomic problems. The

maturities, shorter grace periods, higher and variable interest
rates leading to the bunching of debt and heavy debt service
burden. Nigeria's debt problem was aggravated from 1982
by the rapid accumulation of trade arrears.
The debt problem was also traced to the fall in crude oil
prices in 1978 and the protracted softening of the world oil
market since 1982 with the resultant decline in foreign
exchange earnings and balance of payments pressures. The
simultaneous and continued worsning of the terms oftrade

accumulation of import arrears and defaults on debt service
has threatened the country's credit-worthiness and solvency.
The plotracted restructuring exercises have not only been
complex, protracted and expensive, they have also tended to

large chunks

diyert attention from the more important issues of gowth
and development. Moreover the "new money" packages in
the restructuring rarely materialise, thereby making the
problem of adjustment more burdensome. The problems
of debt conversion were then considered. Drawing on the
expe ences of a number of debt-ridden countries which have
embarked on debt conversion as an alternative approach of

and the drying up of external resources when they were
most needed have worsened the debt problem. Other
33

€asing their debt burden a-nd stimulating growth-induced
investment, the main problems of d€bt conversion were
summarised to include:

(a) unplanned increase in money supply

approved projects and eligible

round'tripping and exchange rate pressures;

(c)

the problem of additionality;

(iii)

controls should be specified on redemption volume,
remittance of profit and dividends, etc. and that

(iv)

adequate provision should be made

creating

inflationary and exchange rate pressures;

(b)

participants both

foreign and nationals;

transactions violating

the

for penalising
provisions of the

programme.

(d) the problern of

In my closing remarks, I woukl like to comment briefly
on the lears that have been expressed by some sections of
the Nigerian public about foreign domination of Nigerian
business as a result of DCP. The experience ol other countries
do not support the claim of loreign domination. Rather
they have shown that only a small proportion of total debt
outstanding get converted. For example, in the best known

determining an optimal transaction's

effective exchange rate; and

(e) the fear of

increas€d foreign ownership
and the associated political sensitivity.

of

business

DCP in countries like Chile, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippine

More importantly, however, and as a guide to designing a
Nigerian DCP, the paper offered some practical suggestions
for minimising or prevelting such problems. The suggestions
include:

(i)

setting

of limits on the

amount

of debt to

be

convert€d i

(ii)
(it)
(iv)

blocking of redemption/proceeds with the CBN with
releases made according to the cash requirements of
approved projects;

of appropriate monetary and

fiscal

policies to mop-up excess liquidity:

(v)

appropriate control on the repatriation ol capital and

profit of approved projects etc..

(vi)

setting of appropriate transaction's effective excharge

rate, taking into consideration the heavy discounts
at which Nigerian debt notes are currently sold in the
secondary market.

After reviewing the

possible advantages

of a Nigerian

and government attitude and pronouncement, it

DCP

was

concluded that there are bright prospects for designing and
operating a viable and beneficial DCP in Nigeria. Some
practical suggestions were also made in relation to the
objectives of and the procedure for such a programme as
well as on the rules, regulations, contrcls and safeguards

which should be leatured in the proposed Nigerian
pro8ramme. Such proposals irtclude the followin8:

(i)

the objectives of the Nigerian DCP should include the
reduction in external d€bt burden, the stimulation of
productiv€ inyestment. the encouragement of the
production of local raw materials, production for
exports and the generation of employment;

(ii) the rules,

regulations and procedure should

be

comprehensive and unambiguous, especially with

regards

to

eligible instruments

and

about a Nigerian DCP should be less about foreign domination
of Nigerian enterprises and more about the few unscrupulous
elements amongst us with tendency to be ready instruments
in the hands of similarly few unscrupulous foreigrers to milk
Nigeria through round tripping and other dubious practices.
AlthougJr the procedures proposed earlier had made
legal provision for malpractlces, I would like to emphasise
that the banking community has a major role to play in the
implementation of a successful DCP. For example, the balks
will not only play advisory roles to thet clients they will also
play cqually vital roles to ensure that the rules and regulations
are adhered to. The implementation and monitoring
procedures which will devolve on them must be discharged
with absolute diligencc and integrity. In the long run, the
succcss of the programme depends on all Nigerians, but more
especially on the banking community. I have no doubt in
my mind that this important role, more than ever before,
will bc creditably discharged.
I thank you for your attention.

minimal use of debt for cash conversion and greater
use of debt for equity;
implementation

s

Argentina, annual debt conyersion has varied from only
$300 million to $700 million. Although some aspects of a
DCP may impinge on some of the existing provisioos of the
Nigerian Elterprises Promotion Decree we would be rest
assured by the undertaking of the President and Commanderin-Chief in his Budget speech referred to earlier on that the
laudable objective of a Nigerian DCP would not run counter
to the Nigerian Enteryrises Promotion Decree, lnfact, going
by the experience of the recent past, the fear to be entertained

to be converted,
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NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL DEBT OT'TSTANDTNGI AIID TOTAL DEBT SERVICE IglO

Total Debt
Outstanding
H

MilIon

$

488.8

1970

Million

l9?5

263.4
27 6.9
322.4
149.9

684.3
308.9
400.4
420.9
523.3
559.2

t91l

2t4.5

r912
1913

t9'14

value of
Export

Total

Debt

Debt

Service

Service

Ralio

H Mrllion

!{ Million

t%)

885.4

31.0
29.9
26.2
30.8

3.5

t,293.4
I,434.2
2.369.2

29.l

0.5

32.1

34.4
25.6

0.1
0.5
0.3

314.6

s93.6

6,709.8

496.9

l9?8

t,265.7

1919
1980

1,5 11.5

1,865.8

162.9
2,163.8
2,824.6
3,444.8

,630.7
6,054.4
10,835.8
14,0??.0

r98l

2,33t.2
E,819.4

3,661 .7
13,124.1

10,470.1

t982
198 3

10,571.1

14,130.7

1984
1985
1986

r4,536.6

18,034.1
t1 ,29't .5
1E,631.3

17,290.6

4t,451.9
r

t98?

1

8,122.5
7,502.5
9,088.0
11,214.8
8,513.0
30,239.9

23,445.1

100,? 89.

I
'

160,8
182.9

2.1

l0l.6

0.1

513.6
5.2

5.0
8.9

t,335.2

17.8

2,640.5
3,718.0
2,502.2
3,590.6

33.2
29.4

Debt

Export

17

29.t
11.9

End ofperiod.
End ol Octobcr I987

1980

1981

1982

198 3

1984

13.3

22.3

101.1

I4I,O

160.0

6.9

t1 .4

8.0

17.6

987

1985

1986

4.2

486.9

333.3

2t.2

2t.9

51.0

94.1

29.1

33.2

29.4

ll.9

15

r

Debt
GDP

Debt

Se

Export

3

1.7

NICERIA'S PRINCIPAL DEBT AND DEBT SERVICE RATIOS I98O _ 1987
(in per cent)

Principal
Ratios

Table

1.8
1.3

5,t94.0

1916

2

2.1

4,925.5

1911

Table

_ Ig77

3.8

4.5

0.7

5.0

t

ice
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Table 4

SECONDARY MARKET I.,OAN PRICES

The fotlowing table is a summary of pdce ranges (as
percentage of the face amount
market on the indicated days.

10.7.87
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador

Egvpt
Ivory Coast
Mexico
Morocco
Nigeria
Panarna
Peru

Philippines
Poland
Romania
South Africa
Venezuela
Yugoslavia

Zaie

a

of the debt) in the secondary

-

50

67-

69

4't

11.5.87

54-57

@- 62
67 -69

58-60
82-83

No bid-46
No bid-50

85-87

47 -49
No bid-50

64-66
56-58
@-66

64-66
54-55
64-66
28-30
6s

-

3l -34

6s-67

6',1

No bid- 14

67

-69
43*44
88-89
60-62
68 -'70
74-76

23-26

No

bid-14
67

-69
44-46

88-

89

64-66

7t

-'t2

74-76
23-26

Source: Shearson khman Brothers loan Transactions Group.
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